Michigan Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 3

1962

Insurance-State Regulation-Unauthorized Insurers False
Advertising Process Act
Chester A. Skinner
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chester A. Skinner, Insurance-State Regulation-Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act, 60
MICH. L. REV. 392 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/9

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT LEGISLATION
INSURANCE-STATE REGULATION-UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS FALSE A.Jr
VERTISING PROCESS Acr-Recent Illinois legislation subjects foreign insurers who are not authorized to do business in Illinois and who circulate
false advertising there to the jurisdiction of the state courts and the State
Insurance Commissioner. When the Insurance Commissioner is informed
of false or misleading advertising, he is to notify the supervisory insurance
official of the domicile state of the foreign insurer. If this notice does not
result in the cessation of the activity, the Commissioner may proceed
against the insurer under the state's Unfair Trade Practice Act. 1 Since
the typical mail order insurer will not have agents or property within the
state, the mere solicitation of business, by mail or otherwise, is made the
equivalent of an appointment of the Insurance Commissioner as the insurer's agent for all service of process. Unauthorized Insurer's False Advertising Process Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 735.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1961).
In response to the Supreme Court's decision that interstate insurance
business was subject to federal regulation,2 Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act,3 which provided that continued state regulation of insurance
was in the public interest and that federal law would be applicable only
to the extent that such business was not regulated by state law. Each state,
prompted by this invitation, passed legislation aimed at completely regulating the insurance industry and thereby precluding the possibility of
intervention by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of
Justice. In FTC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n,4 the Supreme Court held that
in order for state regulation to preclude FTC jurisdiction, it must be
regulation in the state where the deception is practiced and has its impact, rather than regulatory legislation in the domicile state of the foreign
insurer. This holding suggested that the states' efforts to exclude the FTC
had not been wholly successful, and the decision is at least partially responsible for the interest in nation-wide passage of the Unauthorized
Insurer's False Advertising Process Act (UIFAPA) .5 The prospect of gen1 ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1028-41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961). Each of the fifty
states has enacted the equivalent of an Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Illinois version provides for a cease-and-desist order and a maximum penalty of $500 for each
violation. See also CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-15-1 to -13 (1953); N.Y. INs. LAW
§§ 270-82.
2 United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court
thereby overruled the precedents of seventy-five years commencing with the decision in
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
3 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ IOU-15 (1958).
4 362 U.S. 293 (1960) .
5 The act was originally drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) which has taken the position that every state must enact the UIFAPA
if it is to be an effective extension of the Unfair Trade Practices Act and other legisla-
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eral adoption of the UIFAPA poses two questions: first, whether it will
enable the states to maintain exclusive control of the regulation of mail
order insurance; and secondly, as a practical matter, whether it will result
in the effective control of the various deceptive methods used in such
advertising. 6
Assuming the constitutionality of the UIFAPA service of process provisions, 7 the answer to the first question is largely dependent upon the
Court's ultimate interpretation of the McCarran Act provision denying
federal jurisdiction where the particular state has already provided regulation. From a logical and historical standpoint it is arguable that by "regulation" Congress meant effective, workable controls, as opposed to mere
legislative enactments. 8 Although it seemed to adopt the latter alternative in FTC v. National Gas. Co.,9 the Court has modified this interpretation somewhat in the Traveler's Health decision. 10 While equating regulation with legislation avoids the difficulties inherent in determining
whether or not regulation is effective, it may well be responsible for fostering legislation directed more at excluding the FTC than at providing
meaningful regulation. If this actually occurs the Court might further
modify its holding in National Gas. Co., especially since the majority
opinion in Traveler's Health pointedly left open the question of whether
tion which serves adequately to regulate authorized
discussed the desirability of inter-state compacts or
"doing business.'' See 1 NAIC PROCEEDL'IGS 309, 315
Dakota, South Dakota and Nevada have also passed
§ 686.210 (1960).

insurers. The Commissioners also
a re-definition of the concept of
(1961) • California, Maine, North
the act. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT.

6 For a general discussion of the forms and extent of misleading advertising, see
Mccarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail Order Accident and Health Insurance
Policies and Advertising, 2!1 INS. COUNSEL J. 82 (1956).
7 It seems unlikely that the Court will find them unconstitutional as a denial of due
pi-ocess, for the Court has indicated that the states' interest in the regulation of insur•
ance business within their borders warrants the application of a very liberal due process
requirement. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). However,
since McGee involved suit on an insurance contract, and the problem here is one of
jurisdiction for administrative control, it is arguable that the same result should not
necessarily follow. It should also be pointed out that the same provisions for substituted
service which might be sufficient in this act would probably not suffice in other contexts.
Sec Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 2!15 (1958); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
s See 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945) where Senator McCarran states that only effective
regulation will preclude federal intervention. It has been argued, however, that the
legislative history will support either conclusion, and that practical and political con•
sidcrations will influence the result. See Layne, Multiple State Regulation of Mail
Order Insurance, !19 GEo. L.J. 422 (1951) .
o 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
10 Since regulation by the domicile state, if exercised, would be effective, the possi•
bility of less than full use of this power would seem to be the only logical basis for
a distinction between regulation of that type and regulation by the state of "impact."
ITC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n, !162 U.S. 293 (1960) .

394

MICHIGAN LAW .REVIEW

[Vol. 60

or · not legislation in states where advertising is received will divest the
FTC of jurisdiction.11
Even if the Court continues to disregard the effectiveness of legislation
in drawing the jurisdictional line, the problem must be faced in another
respect. The same factors which the Court might consider in determining
whether or not state regulation is effective and therefore exclusive, must
be considered in answering the question of whether or not the UIFAPA
will assure adequate means of coping with the manifold problems of regulating mail order insurance. Regulation incapable of enforcement is
mere chimera. The Unfair Trade Practices Acts generally provide for a
cease-and-desist order and a penalty for .non-compliance. The state may
sue on. its, own statute in the domicile state, or it may first reduce the
penalty to a judgment in its own courts and sue on it in the insurer's
domicile. Whether or not enforcement is possible depends on the extent
to which the t~ndency persists to deny full faith and credit to foreign penal
statutes and to foreign judgments based on penal statutes.12 By inference
the Supreme Court has limited the exception to criminal statutes, 13 and
there is no logical reason for its perpetuation. The Court has recognized
the states' interest in the regulation of insurance in deciding other issues,14
and it probably would hesitate to render these endeavors meaningless as a
regulatory tool on the strength of this attenuated doctrine. Since the Constitution does not forbid states to enforce judgments of sister states based
on penal statutes, interstate compacts requiring the enforcement of such
judgments are a possibility. However, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has discouraged such a proposal, not on the grounds
that it would be ineffective, but because a request for congressional consent would supposedly be inconsistent with states' contention that they are
capable of regulating insurance without any interference by the federal
government, because the Supreme Court would have the power to pass on
the meaning and validity of such a compact, and because it is less likely to
be universally adopted.15 Much of this reasoning seems to be predicated
11 The dissent in Traveler's Health disputes the assertion by the majority that there
is any question to leave open: "Yet even if such legislation proved abortive as a practical
matter . . . such legislation would nonetheless presumably exclude Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction, unless we were to depart from our holding in FTC v. National
Casualty Co., to the effect that it is the existence of state regulatory legislation, and not
the effectiveness of such regulation, that is the controlling factor." FTC v. Traveler's
Health Ass'n, supra note 10, at 305 n.4.
12 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Generally laws are
classified as penal when the recovery provided for is not determined by the injury suffered, and when liability is not dependent upon whether or not the plaintiff was prejudiced by the defendant's non-compliance. Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 188 (1957).
· 13 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ; Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657 (1892).
14 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
15 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 309, 315-16 (1961).

1962]

RECENT LEGISLATION

395

on the assumption that securing exclusive state regulation is of more vital
concern than securing efjective regulation.
Even if all legal obstacles to effective state regulation are removed, a
practical problem remains: many of the states lack the ability to deal effectively with the evil this statute purports to control. 16 To be truly effective
the regulation must be prospective, eradicating misleading advertising
and policies before the insured are injured. While FTC procedures are
prospective,17 most states act primarily on a complaint basis. 18 Inadequate
budgets, small staffs, and dated administrative machinery constitute severe
limitations on the ability of smaller states to regulate satisfactorily,19 and
there is no present indication of any major attempt to remedy these conditions. Since the protection of the public should be of more concern than
the exclusion of the FTC, much might be said for a co-operative system in
which the states continue their traditional regulatory and licensing activity
but allow the FTC to combat the problem of restraining advertising of
mail order companies before it causes injury. Unfortunately co-operation
along these lines appears politically impossible20 and in the final analysis
the interests of those likely to be injured by the deceptive practices of mail
order insurers appear to weigh less than the demand for freedom from
federal intervention. The concept of due process must initially be stretched
to allow this type of state regulation,21 and the extension of state jurisdictional power is unobjectionable only if it actually serves to benefit citizens. Thus, the individual states will have the responsibility of bridging
a potential gap between the intended effect of the legislation and its practical impact, and of proving that their jurisdictional triumph was not
their citizens' loss.
Chester A. Skinner
16 See, e.g., Kimball, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 142
(1961); Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry,
67 YALE L.J. 452 (1958) .
17 See Mccarter, supra note 6, at 100-01.
18 Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry, 67
YALE L.J. 452, 459 (1958).
10 Kimball, supra note 16, at 142, 199.
20 Until the Court declared that the business of insurance was commerce in the
South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n case, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the states alone had been
responsible for insurance regulation. The various state insurance commissioners and
staff members naturally feel that they have a vested interest in maintaining state
hegemony in this area. Their arguments in support of maintaining complete control
often do not rest on a reasoned comparison of state and federal regulation, but rather
on references to the seemingly inherent evils of centralization as compared with the manifest justice of states' rights. See McConnell, State Regulation v. State Regulation Plus
Regulation by Multiple, Decentralized, Independent Federal Agencies, 1956 INS L.J. 697.
21 See note 7 supra.

